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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
Defendants deny jurisdiction in this Court in this case for 
reason that this appeal is not from a final order or judgment of 
the District Court. Because this is a jurisdictional issue, 
appellants address this issue at this juncture. 
Plaintiff Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark (hereinafter referred to 
as, "Clark") previously appealed the judgment entered against him 
by the trial Court, filing his Notice of Appeal with the Fourth 
District Court on January 6, 1993. Defendants then filed a Motion 
for Summary Disposition arguing that Clark's appeal was not from 
a final judgment of the trial court and was not ripe for appeal. 
Defendants argued that the judgment below did not resolve all 
of the claims of all of the parties, since a Counterclaim remains 
pending in the District Court against Clark. The order that 
disposed of Clark's Complaint against Phone Directories Company, 
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "PDC") and Marc Bingham did not 
dispose of Clark as a party to the lawsuit, nor did it dispose of 
PDC's claims against Clark. 
Plaintiff then moved to have this case placed back before the 
Supreme Court for reason that he had erroneously filed the appeal 
with the Court of Appeals, which motion was granted and the case 
transferred to the Supreme Court, which then addressed the Motion 
for Summary Disposition. On April 20, 1993, the Supreme Court, in 
a memorandum decision, granted the Motion and dismissed Clark's 
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appeal "on the ground that the appeal is from a judgment which is 
not final, and this court has no jurisdiction" citing to Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant Clark presents now the same issues, statements and 
the same circumstances except for one thing: after the Supreme 
Court remanded this case back to the District Courtf Clark moved 
for and was granted a new Order from the trial court, certifying 
that the Judgment dismissing Clark's case "is a final judgment, 
pursuant to Rule 54B (sic) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
can be appealed." 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
Rule 54. Judgments: costs. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving 
multiple parties. When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment 
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims 
or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties, and the order or other form 
of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
The "certification" drafted by Appellant Clark and signed by 
the trial court does not make "an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay," but merely states 
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that the Order is made "pursuant to Rule 54B (sic) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and [the judgment] can be appealed." No 
amendments were made to the judgment entered by the trial court. 
This self-serving statement in the pleading drafted by Appellant 
does not create jurisdiction for appellate review so long as fewer 
than all the parties' claims are adjudicated. 
Clark admits in his Appellant's Brief, p. 3, under the 
heading, "Disposition in the Lower Court," that the "remaining 
issues of wrongful termination, damages and defendants' 
Counterclaim were not litigated or otherwise resolved." 
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between all 
of the litigant parties. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 
538 (Utah 1979). Half the controversy herein remains pending in 
the lower court. Phone Directories Company has a counterclaim 
against Sonny Clark that has not been resolved. 
Clark remains a party to the suit; he is not disposed of as 
a party to the lawsuit when he loses his case in chief because the 
pending counterclaim keeps him a party. The lower court's order 
cannot be a final order because of the pending counterclaim. Pate 
v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family 
Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Ut. App. 1988). 
Whether the lower court's ruling is final for appellate 
purposes is a question of law for this Court. Kennecott Corp. v. 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). Where a factual 
overlap exists, between the complaint and the counterclaim, the 
entire matter must be resolved before any ruling is "final" and can 
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be appealed. Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 818 P.2d 2 
(Utah 1991). 
Jurisdiction is not properly laid herein and Clark's appeal 
should be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Were the Conclusions of Law by the District Court correct 
and whether the Court of Appeals should vacate them. 
B. Was Clark an employee or an independent contractor? 
C. Must the trial court accept admissions made in the Answer 
to the Complaint, or may testimony be introduced in contradiction 
to an admission and may the court's findings be based, in part, on 
such testimony adduced at trial? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants concur with part of the "Statement of the Case" 
section of Appellant's Brief at p. 3, but deny the Appellant's 
allegations as contained in the section subtitled "Relevant Facts" 
as it appears in Appellant's Brief at p. 4. 
Defendants agree with Appellant's "Relevant Facts" numbered 
one through three, but dispute those numbered four and five. PDC 
and Bingham deny that Clark was terminated for responding to a 
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subpoena and testifying, but conversely state that PDC did not seek 
to contract further with Clark because of his failure to complete 
the terms of prior agreements, and because he had become 
undesireable to work with, and for other legitimate business 
reasons. Further, appellees deny that Clark was ever an employee 
of Phone Directories or was improperly terminated or that any state 
or federal taxes were due or payable by PDC or Bingham. 
These "Relevant Facts" listed by Appellant are argumentative 
and conclusory. 
Course of Proceedings, Disposition of Case Below. 
The course of proceedings and the disposition at and after 
trial differ from that described by the Appellant. Clark first 
filed an appeal from the District Court judgment which was 
dismissed upon the Supreme Court's entry dated April 20, 1993, "on 
the ground that the appeal is from a judgment which is not final, 
and this court has no jurisdiction." 
This case was remitted to the District Court on April 22, 
1993. The only difference between this appeal the one previously 
dismissed by the Supreme Court is that Clark obtained a 
"Certification of Judgment for Appeal" from the trial court. The 
judgment, findings of fact and conclusions of law were all 
undisturbed. The issues on appeal were the same. The defendants 
counterclaim remains unresolved and is pending in the District 
Court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Based upon the evidence and testimony at trial, the District 
Court made findings of fact which either supported the contention 
that Clark was an independent contractor or supported the 
contention that he was an employee of defendants. When all of the 
evidence was weighed and considered, the trial court's conclusion 
was that Clark was an independent contractor. This ruling was 
correct and should not be altered. 
The lower court, in finding that Clark was an independent 
contractor and not an employee, permitted certain testimony at 
trial which directly contradicted the defendants' Answer to the 
Complaint. Defendants had made admissions in the Answer that were 
incorrect, and witnesses testified to facts tending to prove the 
opposite of what was admitted in the Answer. These facts were 
allowed into evidence, and were sufficient to convince the lower 
court at bench trial that Clark could hire subcontractors and could 
not be terminated at will, which are facts supporting a finding 
that Clark was a contractor and not an employee. 
The trial court did not err in admitting such evidence and 
testimony over the objection of Appellant, where the defendants had 
previously admitted the same allegations in their Answer. If this 
is an error, it is a harmless error. 
The appeal of Clark is without merit. The lower court's 
findings of fact were more than sufficient to support its 
conclusions of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT 
WERE CORRECT AND SHOULD BE UPHELD 
Appellant asks that the lower court's conclusions should be 
reviewed on appeal to determine their correctness and consistency 
with the findings of fact. 
Appellant describes testimony favorable to his position, 
recites portions of the lower court's findings and conclusions on 
that particular issue, and argues that the trial court made the 
wrong decision. Omitted is the overwhelming evidence that 
supports the conclusion that Clark was an independent contractor. 
The District Court acted as fact finder in this bench trial, 
and its well-reasoned findings of fact should not be overruled 
absent a clear showing that the great weight of the evidence does 
not support the findings. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987). In reviewing a judgment after a bench trial, the appellate 
court will defer to the trial court's factual assessment unless 
there is a clear error. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker 
Appliance and Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); Eskelsen v. 
Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). 
Appellant makes no attempt to show that the lower court's 
findings were erroneous or lacked support. He fails to note that 
the trial court depended upon the testimony of at least five 
witnesses, three of which were called by Clark as his own 
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witnesses. (Finding of Fact No. 5). 
Clark also omits in reference to his own testimony, the 
impeachment of his character and his own tax records and accounting 
of his business affairs, which were weighed by the trial court in 
determining his believability and in resolving inconsistencies in 
testimony. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in 
part: 
Rule 52. Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately 
the conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of 
its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of witnesses. . . . 
[remainder of Rule 52(a) is omitted] 
There is nothing in Appellant's brief to justify any 
alteration of the lower court's findings and conclusions. 
POINT II. 
CLARK WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
The dispute below is whether PDC controlled Clark to the 
extent that he was an employee, or did not have that degree of 
8 
control thereby making Clark was an independent contractor. 
Both Clark and defendants PDC and Bingham agreed at the time 
of trial to utilize Utah Code Ann. 35-4-22.3(3) (a through t) to 
establish the criteria to be considered that distinguish between 
employee status and independent contractor status. This section 
is part of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act and is, in fact, 
the criteria used in determining administratively whether an 
individual applying for benefits is eligible. The District Court 
considered the facts of this case in light of the potential 
application of each of the subsections (a) through (t) of the Act. 
The trial court found that some of the evidence did support 
Clark's position, and found in his favor on those points. As found 
in the Conclusions of Law, these include the following (portions 
potentially favorable to Clark are underlined): 
Subsection (b): Though plaintiff was required to 
attend an annual meeting. PDC imposed minimal, if 
any, formal training requirements. PDC essentially 
allowed Mr. Clark to use his own sales methods. 
Subsection (f)s Plaintiff had a continuing 
relationship with PDC, but did so only by 
continuing to accept new "books" as PDC offered them 
to him. Plaintiff essentially worked on a book-by-
book basis. 
Subsection (k): Plaintiff was required to submit 
regular reports to enable PDC to determine what 
money was owed him. 
Subsection (n): Defendants supplied some forms for 
plaintiff's use in his sales. However, plaintiff 
was responsible for any other materials to the 
extent that they were necessary. 
Subsection (q): Although plaintiff devoted some 
time to his heating and air conditioning business, 
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plaintiff spent the majority of his time fulfilling 
contracts for PDC. 
Subsection (r) : Plaintiff did not have his own 
office, hold a business license, maintain a business 
telephone, or advertise. 
In some instances, the testimony revealed that certain 
elements of "control" were necessary and innocuous, such as the 
fact that PDC supplies customer contracts to the sales persons in 
order to maintain uniformity and ensure delivery of the service to 
the customer. 
Clark was also required to submit regular reports, but that 
only makes sense if he wants to receive his commission for his 
sales. Clark admitted at trial that a company cannot pay a sales 
commission until the sales person properly accounts for it by 
turning in contracts and sales reports. (Tr. 77 1. 7-12). 
PDC did schedule a sales meeting and did call it "mandatory" 
in its announcement, and Clark did attend. No evidence was 
presented that any sales representatives were "fired" or 
disciplined in any manner for not attending the sales meeting. 
Clark testified that he did not know of a single individual fired 
for failure to attend any sales meeting. (Tr. 68, 1. 23-25). 
Despite the trial court's finding that Clark did not have his 
own office, telephone or business license, Clark's tax records for 
1980-1990 (Defendants' Exhibits 9-19), indicate that he deducted 
thousands of dollars for a home office, utilities, telephone, home 
mortgage interest, business licenses, legal expenses, travel and 
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entertainmentf and automobile milage. Clark held himself out to 
be self-employed in all of his business dealings. 
Clark complains that PDC places deadlines on him to complete 
and turn in sales work. However, Clark himself testified that the 
reason PDC closes sales on a particular directory is "so they can 
have time to do production and printing and all of that before the 
book should be issued." (Tr. 72 1.22-25; p. 74 1. 13 through p. 75 
1. 25). 
Clark alleges that he could not hire and supervise 
subcontractors to help in his sales work and that he could not 
assign his duties or income to another person. However, Clark 
admits that he asked PDC to assign all of his 1989 commissions to 
his ex-wife, Linda Clark, totaling $34,132.15. (Tr. 185 1. 19 
through p. 188 1. 2). Clark also paid Linda Clark $1,780.00 in 
1985 to be his "secretary/" and the deduction was taken on Clark's 
Schedule C tax form for his sole proprietorship business of 
directory advertising sales. (Tr. 132 1. 22 through p. 133 1. 7; 
Defendants' Exhibit 14). 
Clark's association with PDC is typical of the relationship 
between PDC and its [other] salespeople. (Findings of Fact No. 5). 
Despite Clark's contentions, other sales representatives testified 
that the normal way sales people operated was consistent with the 
way independent contractors operate. 
Cindy Sortor testified that her first experience with PDC came 
after meeting Sonny Clark in 1983 while both she and Clark were 
selling ads for a publications called, "TV Fanfare" in Great Falls, 
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Montana. She testified that Clark told her about his concurrent 
sales work for PDC and asked her to join him selling yellow page 
advertising. When Sortor and Clark went on her first PDC sales 
canvass to Reno, Nevada, she and Clark split their commissions with 
each other. (Tr. 238, 1. 22 to p. 239, 1. 1; and, p. 240 1. 20 
through p. 241 1. 3). 
Other persons have worked for Sortor, from time to time, 
helping her perform her sales duties. She hired her sister to close 
sales in one part of one market, paying her $300.00 per week. (Tr. 
241 1. 7-23). She also hired another sister, and split commissions 
with her mother-in-law and with other PDC sales representatives. 
She hired a non-relative once to work in her home office and make 
telephone contacts with customers she may have missed while in that 
area, mail out contracts to customers, help her with filing and 
paperwork, and paid that person an hourly wage. (Tr. 276 1. 9 
through p. 277 1. 6). 
As for Clark, Sortor testified that she knew of a time when 
Clark hired subcontractors (Tr. 252 1. 15-20) and that Clark has 
also sold ads for other yellow pages publishers. (Tr. 253 1. 15-
20) . 
Sortor also testified that she has a Mary Kay Cosmetics 
proprietorship which she operates in addition to her self 
employment as a yellow pages ad sales representative. She has a 
separate office at home, and she does Mary Kay work in other towns 
while she is there selling ads for PDC. (Tr. 230 1. 18-23; 231 1. 
21 through 232 1. 8). She even gave facials, sold products and 
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recruited new sales reps to work for her at the motel room she was 
using as her directory sales headquarters. (Tr. 299 1. 2-12). 
She states that PDC does not pay for or reimburse for items 
like glue stick or scissors, even though these are necessary tools 
of the business of ad sales, and that she is free to work her own 
schedule. (Tr. 245 1. 3-24). 
She directly contradicted Clark's testimony on nearly every 
point , and for each subsection of the code that describes the 
differences between contractor and employee, Sortor testified that 
there was little or no control by the company over the sales 
contractors. 
No requirement existed requiring sales representatives work 
a set schedule or number of hours. (Tr. 246 1. 7-15). She has 
complete freedom to come and go as she wishes. (Tr. 284 1. 1-19). 
She is free to make a sale by telephone and mail the contract to 
the customer. (Tr. 248 1. 11-24). There is no requirement to call 
in daily or weekly, but PDC does request that information be called 
in to aid their record keeping; she has never been sanctioned for 
her own failures to call in. (Tr. 250 1.5-12). There is no 
specific training requirement. (Tr. 251 1. 3- 10). Sales 
contractors were rewarded with cash bonuses for attending 
"mandatory" sales meetings, but were never sanctioned for not 
attending, and Sortor admits she showed up for one such meeting, 
collected her bonus and left before the meeting ended. (Tr. 251 
1. 11-22; p. 252 1. 1-10). She can set her own time schedule and 
the company has never set a time schedule for her. (Tr. 254 1. 15-
13 
19) . Never has she been required to have full-time devotion to this 
work, and is not restricted from doing other work and is allowed 
to work at her own pace. (Tr. 254 1. 24 through 255 1. 7). She was 
never told how to dress by anyone at PDC, despite the "dress code" 
published in the manual, and wears clothing she thinks appropriate 
for the community and the clientele. (Tr. 259 1. 1-24). Never has 
she been sanctioned for declining PDC's offer to work a market she 
did not like. (Tr. 278 1. 2-6). 
Clark was found to have a continuing relationship with PDC, 
but this relationship was on a "book by book" basis, and PDC would 
extend him invitations to work in certain markets (Findings of Fact 
No. 11). Sortor testified that she requests certain markets be 
assigned to her each year, and PDC has always renewed their working 
relationship in two, specific markets because of Sortor's success; 
however, PDC has declined to offer some markets to her, including 
some that she had previously worked in, and had requested to have 
again. (Tr. 290 1. 2-20). 
Vickie lechelbeger testified that she makes separate, verbal 
agreements with PDC to sell in a particular market, based on her 
requests for areas and time periods of her own liking, and, how 
confident PDC's sales director is that she will make the kind of 
sales that the company projects and expects. (Tr. 305 1. 13-24). 
The only work a sales representative is prohibited from is 
direct competition with PDC. lechelbeger currently operates a dump 
truck service with her brother while contracting to sell ads for 
PDC in several markets. (Tr. 306 1. 11 through 307 1. 2). She, 
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too, hired another person (her brother) to assist her in her 
advertising sales, paying him from her own account. (Tr. 312 1. 15 
through 313 1. 14). 
Iechelbeger also confirmed much of Sortor's testimony: that 
she could set her own schedule; she is free to use her own methods 
and techniques; training tapes and videos were made available by 
PDC but she was never required to use them; that she could hire 
others to help her; that no guarantees existed for contractors to 
return to a specific market; she is not required to work full time 
in ad sales; she is not required to call in daily; and, that her 
"required" weekly sales report is really just a bill for 
commissions earned. You can't get paid unless you send a bill. 
Clark chose to work or refrain from working other jobs or in 
other independent businesses. This was his choice to make and PDC 
did not force him to give up his other business ventures, nor was 
he prohibited from new business involvements. 
If the sales person doesn't complete the contract and leaves 
before the market has been fully canvassed, then PDC has no 
incentive to contract with that person for any future sales 
campaigns because her or she is not dependable or reliable, and PDC 
sometimes is forced to send others to complete the job, according 
to Cindy Sortor. (Tr. 263 1. 2-24). 
According to Paul Starkey, who was PDC's national sales 
manager in 1991 prior to when Clark alleges the wrongful 
termination, Clark had not finished two contracted areas and 
therefore, Starkey opted to not allow Clark to contract with PDC 
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for another directory, but that no sales representative would have 
their contract terminated unless they failed to complete that 
directory by the closing date. (Tr. 386 1. 11 through 387 1. 14). 
Despite Starkey's objections, PDC did agree to let Clark sell 
in Alaska in 1991, and again, Clark left early, before the job was 
done. (Tr. 388 1. 23 through 389 1. 16). 
Overall, the lower court found that a large preponderance of 
the evidence supported the defendants' contention that Clark was 
an independent contractor. Appellant Clark relies on a 1987 sales 
manual that, according to PDC secretary lone Chilton, was actually 
compiled from another publisher's manual, and much of which did not 
apply to the way PDC did business with its contractors, and the so-
called "requirements" of this manual (dress code, calling in to 
office, etc.) were never enforced. (Tr. 349 1. 6 through 351 1. 
23). Several witnesses contradicted the allegations of Clark, and 
the trial court weighed all of this testimony in making its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The necessary indices of 
control by an employer over an individual simply are not present 
in the instant case to find Clark to be an employee. 
This case compares factually to Adele's Housekeeping, Inc. v. 
Deot. of Employment Security, 757 P.2d 480 (Ut. App. 1988). The 
housekeeping service was held not to be an employer, and the 
individual housekeepers were contractors and not employees where 
the service provided job assignments, advertised and took a 
referral fee from each customer account, and the housekeepers had 
their own equipment and supplies, provided their own 
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transportation, were paid by the job but were not told how or when 
to do their job, and paid their own taxes. 
POINT III, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
BY ALLOWING ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS' 
ADMISSIONS IN THEIR ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT. 
The original counsel for defendants, in answering the 
Complaint, and again, in submitting an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, failed to correctly respond to several allegations 
in the Complaint. Specifically, paragraph 8(f) of the Amended 
Answer states: 
Defendants admit that during his employment with 
PDC, plaintiff could not hire subcontractors to 
solicit yellow page advertising for him or with him. 
(Amended Answer, p. 4, paragraph 8f.) 
Testimony from several witnesses was allowed by the trial 
court, which established that many sales representatives of PDC do 
hire subcontractors to help them perform sales, appointment 
setting, message taking, delivery of ad proofs and so forth. Clark 
denied that he ever subcontracted out sales work and denied that 
PDC would permit such conduct, but other witnesses testified 
differently. The District Court, weighing the evidence and 
examining the candor and believability of the witnesses, agreed 
that sales representatives may employ subcontractors. 
Defendants also erroneously admitted in paragraph 8k. of the 
Answer: 
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Defendants admit that during his employment with 
PDC, plaintiff could have been terminated as an 
independent contractor at any time. 
(Amended Answer p. 5, paragraph 8k.) 
These allegations correspond to subsections (s) and (t) of the 
Unemployment Act, and the trial court held in its Conclusions of 
Law: 
Subsection (s): PDC could not have terminated 
plaintiff during the performance of any given 
contract, unless plaintiff breached the contract. 
Subsection (t): Plaintiff probably could have 
terminated his relationship with PDC at any time. 
The admission of paragraph 8k. of the Amended Answer was found 
to be incorrect based upon the evidence and testimony at trial, 
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered 
consistent with the trial testimony and evidence. The Court was 
not bound by the admission contained in the Amended Answer. 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in part states: 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission 
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court 
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shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable 
the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(emphas is added). 
(c) Relation back of amendments . Whenever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the 
date of the original pleading. 
[Rule 15 (b) and (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] 
The foregoing rule permits liberal amending of any pleading 
to conform to the evidence, and should apply to Answers as well as 
Complaints. Failure to amend does not change the result of a 
trial on the merits of these issues. 
Whether a defense was pleaded in the Answer, even an 
Affirmative defense, is not conclusive if the issue is ultimately 
tried by express or implied consent. General Ins. Co. of America 
v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp. , 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976). At the time 
of trial, Clark had sought, and the parties stipulated to, a 
bifurcation of trial of the issues, and agreed that he would 
dismiss his claim for wrongful termination if the court found that 
he was an independent contractor and not an employee. 
Clark consented to the trial of these issues, which turned out 
adverse to his expectations. Both parties consented to the 
splitting of issues for trial on the merits, and both parties 
impliedly consented to use of Utah Code Ann. 35-4-22.3(3) as a 
measuring stick by which Clark's employment status was to be 
judged, since both parties relied upon this statute in their trial 
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briefs. Clark consented to introduction of any relevant evidence 
regarding his status as a contractor or employee since these were 
his chosen issues for which he had sought relief in his lawsuit, 
and he had the burden of proof on each of these issues. 
The language of Rule 15 states that any "failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." Clark 
lost on these issues at a trial on the merits. The results should 
stand because the evidence supports the trial court's conclusions, 
regardless of what is denied or admitted in the Answer. 
These two items were defective in defendants' Answer and 
Amended Answer. Witnesses at trial established that sales 
representatives in fact contracted with PDC for each publication, 
each year, and as a matter of practice and policy, their contracts 
were terminated only in rare instances, such as where the sales 
representative left before finishing, or some improper conduct by 
the contractor would amount to a breach of their contract with PDC. 
If a sales representative does poorly, he or she may not 
receive future invitations from PDC to sell ads for other or 
subsequent directories, or in another market. The company 
certainly must be allowed to protect its own interests by 
contracting with only those sales persons that are capable and 
effective. 
The Amended Answer clearly was incorrect in admitting that 
employment could be terminated at will, and the trial court 
permitted the contradictory evidence to be admitted. As a result, 
the court found that Clark could both hire subcontractors, and, 
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that he could not be terminated at will. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Clark is not relieved of his burden of 
proof. If Clark could not affirmatively prove that subcontracting 
was prohibited and that he could have been terminated at will, then 
he fails in his burden of proof on these two points. The evidence 
at trial clearly supported the findings and conclusions on these 
issues. 
Appellant Clark did not seek specific exclusion of evidence 
by means of a Motion in Limine prior to, or at the time of trial. 
Clark has never asserted how he would be prejudiced by the 
admission of this particular testimony at trial. The testimony was 
useful to the trier of fact in making his findings. 
Clark's only objection to this testimony is that it 
contradicts two of defendants' admissions in the Amended Answer. 
The testimony that Clark objects to establishes that PDC sales 
representatives can subcontract and cannot be terminated at will. 
Clark was permitted to, and did, present testimony and other 
evidence to the trial court that purported to prove that Clark and 
other sales representatives were prohibited from subcontracting and 
could be terminated at will. These conflicting testimonies were 
examined and weighed by the trial court, which found the weight of 
the evidence supported finding Clark an independent contractor and 
not an employee. 
The evidence supporting the defendants' contention that Clark 
could and did hire subcontractors and that his contractual 
relationship with PDC could only be terminated if he breached the 
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contract, was probative and valuable to the lower court. 
Many different facts were considered by the lower court in 
arriving at its decision, and the outcome of the ruling would have 
been the same, even if this evidence had been excluded. Defendant 
prevailed on nearly every criteria listed in each subsection of the 
law as addressed by the lower court and a different finding on 
these two issues alone would not be enough to change the result. 
Clark was proven to be a contractor and not an employee because the 
weight of the evidence supported such a conclusion. 
Appellant Clark misstates the findings of Hill v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 829 P.2d 142 (Ut. App. 1992). In that case, 
the trial court correctly denied plaintiff leave to amend his 
complaint after seven years of litigation, to include allegations 
of tortious conduct that would support their prayer for punitive 
damages. The trial court found that this proposed amendment was 
so late in the course of the litigation that it was not timely, not 
justified and would result in prejudice to the responding party, 
and because the movant was clearly aware of the facts underlying 
the proposed amendment long before its filing. 
The test in allowing or disallowing an amended pleading is 
based on three factors: "the timeliness of the motion; the 
justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting 
prejudice to the responding party." Ibid, at 149, citing Regional 
Sales Agency, Inc., v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Ut. App. 
1989). Neither these cases nor any cited by Appellant deal with 
the issue of amendments to an answer. 
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The Appellant has failed to show that he was or could be 
prejudiced in any way by admitting evidence at trial that 
contradicted admissions made in the Answer. Appellant Clark was 
the party that suggested trying this issue separately, and he 
cannot possibly claim surprise or prejudice if the defendants 
merely present evidence to support their defense. Rule 15, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the findings and conclusions, 
after a trial on the merits, to stand, even if they are partly 
based on this evidence which contradicts the pleadings. 
Whether defendants are allowed to actually amend their earlier 
Answer is not important. Evidence properly came before the court 
at trial which supported or refuted claims of the respective 
parties, and this evidence resulted in the lower court findings 
against Clark, which findings should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants and Appellees Phone Directories Co., Inc., and Marc 
Bingham, pray the Court of Appeals to Dismiss the Appeal of 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark and deny him 
any relief sought herein. This Court lacks proper jurisdiction 
over this matter for reason that Clark's appeal is from an order 
of the District Court which is not final so long as PDC's 
counterclaim against Clark remains pending in the District Court. 
This Court should dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
Should the other issues be considered by the Court, Defendants 
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argue that Clark was found to be an independent contractor and 
specifically not an employee, after the District Court properly 
weighed and reviewed the evidence and the testimony of witnesses 
at a trial on the merits. The evidence from trial supports the 
findings. 
There is no reason to reverse any of the findings or 
conclusions of the lower court. Evidence was properly admitted, 
including the admission of evidence in contradiction to the 
defendants' Answer, and findings based upon this evidence were 
properly entered. The legal characterization of Clark as an 
independent contractor resulted in the dismissal of his suit 
against PDC and Bingham, and was arrived at based on the weight of 
the evidence supporting this conclusion. There is no reversible 
error. Clark's appeal lacks merit. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants and Appellees submit that the Appeal of 
Clark should be dismissed, or in the alternative, that the judgment 
of the District Court be affirmed. 
DATED this jI day of December, 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Brief of the 
Defendants/Appellees Phone Directories Company, Inc. and Marc 
Bingham, was made by mailing/hand dyllvorlftg at least two copies 
of the foregoing brief to John Preston Creer, counsel for 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK, 
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vs. 
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC., 




NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CIVIL NUMBER 910400806 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING 
Notice is hereby given that Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark, plaintiff above 
named, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court on Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order signed by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge, on 
December 8, 1992, and entered on December 9, 1992, and an Order entered on 
May 18, 1993, that the Final Judgment heretofore referred to was certified for 
appeal. 
Dated this 7 day of June, 1993. 
Jomy£reston Creer 
/Attorney for the Plaintiff 
i/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, on the # day of June, 1993 to the 
following: 
Edward D. Flint 
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC. 




JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL 
CIVIL NUMBER 910400806 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING 
On the 8th day of December, 1992, Judgment was entered after a bench 
trial, held on August 27, 28 and September 22,1992. A copy of the Judgment is 
attached hereto. 
It is hereby certified that this Judgment is a final judgment, pursuant to 
Rule 54B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and can be appealed. 
DATED this ZLI day of June, 1993. 
Approved as to Form: 
^ — 
R5yM. Harding 
met Court Judge 
Edward D. Flint 
Attorney for the Defendants 
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CERTIFICATION OF JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on the /x day of May, 1993 to the following: 
Edward D. Flint 
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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EXIBIT C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Phone Directories Company, 
Inc., a Utah corporation; 
and Marc Bingham, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion 
to transfer this appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, filed 
February 26, 1993. 
Now therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above appeal 
is transferred to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 44, 
Utah R. App. P. 
Dated this r/ day of March, 1993. 
FOR THE COURT: 
*»r 
ORDER 
Case No. 930016-CA 
A 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the f)(A day of March, 1993, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the 
following: 
John Preston Creer 
Attorney at Law 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Edward D. Flint 
Flint & Christensen 
Attorneys at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Fourth District 
Utah County 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84601 
Trial Court No. #901400806 
fauJLt/. 
Caroline Workman 
Jud ic i a l Secretary 
v/<? / f^^k^H^ Ls 'O 
930016-CA 
EXIBIT D 
IN THJi bUFKtriL uuuivj. 
STATE OF UTAH 
3 32 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
March 9, 1993 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK oi l %-\^AX 
4 t h D i s t . Cou r t Utah County CAHil. 
A p p e a l s C l e r k 
125 N o r t h 100 West [LJ£[ . dryty 
Provo, UT 84601 
Cecil Eugene "Sonny11 Clark, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 930116 
Phone Directories Company, 930016-CA 
Inc., a Utah Corproation, 910400806 
and Marc Bingham, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
The above referenced case has been transferred from the 
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. All further documents 
should be filed with the Supreme Court. Please take note of the 
above-referenced Supreme Court docket number. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
EXIBIT E 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF.UTAH ' ' , . 
ooOoo - " -
Regular February Term, 19936 April 20, 1993 
Cecil Eugene "Sonny11 Clark, REMITTITUR 
Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 930116 
District No. 910400806 
v. 
Phone Directories Company, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
and Marc Bingham, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellee's motion to dismiss this matter is hereby 
granted on the ground that the appeal is from a judgment which 
is not final, and this court has no jurisdiction. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 54(b). 




STATE OF UTAH 
3 32 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
April 20, 1993 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Edward D. Flint 
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 930116 
Phone Directories Company, 930016-CA 
Inc., a Utah Corproation, 910400806 
and Marc Bingham, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellee's motion to dismiss this matter is hereby 
granted on the ground that the appeal is from a judgment 
which is not final, and this court has no jurisdiction. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b). 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
EXIBITG 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
April 22, 1993 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Edward D. Flint 
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 930116 
Phone Directories Company, 930016-CA 
Inc., a Utah Corproation, 910400806 
and Marc Bingham, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
THIS DAY, this case remitted to 4th Dist. Court Utah County. 
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JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, and 
MARC BINGHAM, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL y 
CIVIL NUMBER 910400806 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING 
Notice is hereby given that Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark, plaintiff above 
named, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals on Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order signed by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge, on 
December 8, 1992, and entered on December 9, 1992. 
Dated this (?_ day of January, 1993. 
Teston Creer 
ftorney for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, on the ^ day of January, 1993 to the 
following: 
Edward D. Flint 
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
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PHONE DIRECTORIES, I N C . , 
A UTAH CORPORATION, and 
MARC BINGHAM, 
Defendants. 
M^ICBOFIMED ^ J / J j J . / 
raodiooDD JUDGMENT 
Case No. 91040806 
The case of Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark v. Phone 
Directories, Inc. et. al, No. 91040806, came on for trial before 
the Honorable Ray H. Harding of the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah on August 27, 28 and September 22, 1992. The plaintiff 
was represented by counsel John Preston Creer and the defendant 
was represented by Edward D. Flint. 
After reviewing all the evidence, the Court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,. Based on these Findings 
and Conclusions, the Court hereby adjudges and decrees as follows: 
1. Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark was an independent 
contractor; 
2. A judgment of no cause of action is entered against 
plaintiff; and 
3. The case is dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this y day of /C&JL^ 1992 
SUBMITTED BY: 
EDWARD D". FEINT 
Attorney for Defendants 





HARDING, JUDGE . r~ / ^ \ -" ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
N PRESTON CREER 
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PHONE DIRECTORIES, INC., 
A UTAH CORPORATION, and 
MARC BINGHAM, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OP FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 91040806 
The case of Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark v. Phone 
Directories, Inc. et. al. No. 91040806, came on for trial before 
the Honorable Ray H. Harding of the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah on August 27, 28 and September 22, 1992. The plaintiff 
was represented by counsel John Preston Creer and the defendant 
was represented by Edward D. Flint. The plaintiff's claim was 
based on a theory of wrongful discharge. As a threshold issue, 
the parties had stipulated that if Mr. Clark could not establish 
that he was an employee, he would dismiss the complaint. Thus, 
II 
j| the issue tried and determined in this case was whteher Mr. Clark 
; was an employee or independent contractor. 
The plaintiff presented evidence through the testimony 
of Sonny Clark, Linda Young, David Young and Don Reevely to 
establish that Mr. Clark was an employee of Phone Directories. 
The defendant presented testimony through Cindy Sorter, Vicki 
Iechelbeger, lone Chilton, and Jim Latham to establish that Mr. 
j; Clark was an independent contractor. All of the witnesses, save 
\\ Mr. Latham and Ms. Chilton, were sales representatives and were 
jj associated with Phone Directories during the same period of time 
i ! i 
jj as Mr. Clark. After considering the evidence present by the j 
i j J 
j! parties over the three days of trial, reading the pre- and post- j 
I trial briefs of the parties, and being fully informed of the facts j 
i! ! 
jj and law, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. J 
Findings of Fact 
1. Plaintiff Sonny Clark worked for Phone Directories 
as a sales representative from 1980 through 1991. 
2. Defendant Phone Directories, Inc. (PDC) is a Utah 
and Alaska corporation with its principal place of business in 
I Provo, Utah. 
| 3. PDC sells yellow page advertising and makes J 
regional yellow page directories throughout the continental United ! 
i 
! 
States. PDC has yellow page directories in a number of states i 
I I 
j from North Carolina to Alaska. j 
II | 
|J 4. To sell advertising in the geographic areas covered 
I by the directories, Phone Directories hires sales representatives ! 
i 
| to contact each business in the region to provide them the 
! opportunity to purchase advertising in the directory. 
j 5. Based on the testimony of Mr. Clark, Vicki 
! Iechelbeger, Cindy Sorter, Linda Young, David Young and Don 
: Reevely, all of whom were sales representatives of PDC for varying 
2 
\\h) 
lengths of time and in different locations, Mr. Clark's 
association with PDC is typical of the relationship between PDC 
J and its sales people. 
11 
6. Mr. Clark's sales relationship was memorialized in 
;| a written contract in which he was characterized as an independent 
il contractor. The contract provided that Mr. Clark could "handle 
11 
j] any other type of personal endeavors as long as [he] do[es] not 
i| 
l represent work for any organization of personal interests which 
might be competitive to [PDC]". 
7. During the period between 1980 through 1991, Mr. 
Clark worked in the western United States — principally in 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming. 
He also conducted various other business operations including a 
J heating and air conditioning service out of his home. Mr. Clark 
il also sold yellow page advertising for another yellow page 
advertiser that did not compete in the same geographic area as the 
I defendant. Nevertheless, the majority of plaintiff's time during 
i| 
It this period was spent performing contracts for PDC. 
! j 
| 8. The evidence also showed that other sales 
j representatives were allowed and frequently did maintain other 
business while performing their contracts with PDC. Specifically, 
Vickie lechelbeger owned, operated and managed a dump truck 
service and Cindy Sorter was a representative with Mary Kay 




: 9, PDC did not provide Mr. Clark with any formal 
; training. His sales methods or techniques were adapted from his 
•• own experience and PDC did not impose any particular sales 
|| protocol on plaintiff. The same was true with the other sales 
representative witnesses. Although PDC had an annual meeting to 
• i 
!i which plaintiff was required to attend, plaintiff was essentially 
jj free to sell advertising in the manner that he determined to be 
j most effective. 
10. Plaintiff was free to conduct his business as he 
saw fit. Plaintiff was not physically within PDC's direction or 
control. He set his own schedule, sales appointments, managed his 
n own books, arranged his own transportation, provided his own 
supplies (except for uniform sales contracts) and was responsible 
jj for virtually every other part of the sales function. Plaintiff 
I 
Ji solicited his clients in person and used his own automobile to 
1 
!j make such contacts. The evidence presented from all of the sales 
H 
Ij representative witnesses supports this finding. PDC did require 
I! | that Mr. Clark provide weekly sales reports to enable PDC to 
h 
jj determine what money was owed to him so that he could be paid 
!l under the contracts. 
11. Although plaintiff was entitled to receive 
• j 
"tradeouts", wherein plaintiff received lodging, food, and gas in 
* exchange for advertising, plaintiff was not required to do so. If 
plaintiff was unable to establish a tradeout, or decided for some 
4 
reason not to use a tradeout, plaintiff was ultimately responsible 
for his own expenses and was not entitled to reimbursement. 
:j 12. Plaintiff's sales efforts were largely independent 
!; of the success or continuation of PDC's business. 
\\ 13. Although plaintiff was ultimately responsible to 
j| see that each sales area was successfully solicited, and thus the 
jj job could not be assigned, plaintiff was free to hire and 
supervise other people to perform the sales task. The evidence 
from the other sales representatives provided also indicates that 
sales representatives routinely hired others to assist in the 
solicitation of businesses in the contracted area. 
14. Plaintiff contracted with PDC on a "book-by-book" 
jj basis. Any continuing relationship between the parties existed 
jj because each party agreed to continue with the business 
j| relationship. Plaintiff was free to leave after the completion of 
;i any book, and PDC was free not to contract with plaintiff for 
jj another book. 
ii 
|! 15. Plaintiff was paid on a strict commission basis. 
ii 
j! 16. Plaintiff's profits or losses were directly related 
i to the services performed, the hours worked, and the good and bad 
; business decisions that were made. 
17. Plaintiff did not maintain an office, hold a 
business license, maintain a business phone or advertise. Some of 
the other sales representatives did, however, have offices and 
business phones. 
5 
18. While the plaintiff was performing any given 
contract, PDC could not terminate plaintiff's rights under the 
| contract unless there was a breach of the contract. 
i 
i Conclusions of Law 
| 
' This case involves a cause of action based on wrongful 
! discharge. However, as the parties recognize, the threshold issue 
to any determination of wrongful discharge is the legal conclusion 
that plaintiff was an employee, rather than an independent 
contractor, and as such entitled to bring the wrongful discharge 
claim. In that regard, the parties have stipulated that the first 
issue for the court is a determination whether Mr. Clark was an 
employee. 
In support of their respective positions, both parties 
| have relied on Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22.3(3) to establish the 
criteria to be considered in order to distinguish between 
j independent contractor status and employee status. Although § 35-
4-22.3(3) deals specifically with the Utah Unemployment 
! Compensation Act, the Court considers this section to be a helpful 
I guide in determining whether Mr. Clark was an employee or an 
I independent contractor. Therefore, the Court has considered the 
facts of this case in light of each subsection of § 35-4-
22.3(3)(a)-(t) and concludes under each section as follows: 
Subsection (a): Although PDC set broad requirements 
for location and duration of service, and imposed specific 
6 
; reporting requirements, the Court finds that plaintiff was 
essentially free to set his own schedule. 
Subsection (b): Though plaintiff was required to 
'i attend an annual meeting, PDC imposed minimal, if any, formal 
\\ training requirements. PDC essentially allowed Mr. Clark to use 
jj his own sales methods. 
jj Subsection (c): The court finds that plaintiff's 
I services were largely independent of the success or continuation 
of defendant's business. 
I Subsection (d) and (e): Although plaintiff's services 
could not be assigned, plaintiff enjoyed the right to hire and 
supervise others to perform the contract. 
Subsection (f): Plaintiff had a continuing 
relationship with PDC, but did so only by continuing to accept new 
"books" as PDC offered them to him. Plaintiff essentially worked 
! i 
jj on a book-by-book basis. |l 
I Subsection (g): See Court's consideration of 
! 
!l subsection (a) . 
I Subsection (h): The Court finds that plaintiff was 
! free to devote time to other business endeavors and did so. 
Subsection (i): Plaintiff was not physically within 
• defendant's direction and supervision. To the extent that 
i plaintiff's compliance with the contract required that he contact 
each business in the area, plaintiff supplied his own car to make 
those contacts. 
7 
Subsection (j): Plaintiff enjoyed substantial 
flexibility in setting and working at his own pace. 
Subsection (k): Plaintiff was required to submit 




'I Subsection (1): Plaintiff was paid on a straight 
Ii commission basis. 
jj Subsection (m) : Although plaintiff could cover some 
j j of his expenses through "trades," he was ultimately responsible 
I for his expenses and was not entitled to reimbursement. 
i Subsection (n): Defendants supplied some forms for 
h plaintiff's use in his sales. However, plaintiff was responsible 
l! for any other materials to the extent that they were necessary. 
ii . . . . 
i Subsection (o): This subsection is largely 
ij 
J | inapplicable to this case because the nature of the business at 
.j 
jj issue does not require a "real, essential, and adequate 
!| 
ij investment" (other than perhaps an automobile). At any rate, it 





 Subsection (p): Plaintiff's profits and losses were 
directly related to the services he performed and the good or poor 
!
 decisions that he made. 
I! Subsection (q) : Although plaintiff devoted some time 
to his heating and air conditioning business, plaintiff spent the 
majority of his time fulfilling contracts for PDC. 
8 
Subsection (r) : Plaintiff did not have his own 
office, hold a business license, maintain a business telephone, or 
advertise. 
Subsection (s): PDC could not have terminated 
plaintiff during the performance of any given contract, unless 
plaintiff breached the contract. 
Subsection (t): Plaintiff probably could have 
terminated his relationship with PDC at any time. 
Although, individually, a few of the factors considered 
above weigh in the favor of a finding that Mr. Clark was an 
employee, on balance the evidence preponderates in favor of a 
finding that plaintiff was an independent contractor. Therefore, 
the Court concludes that bases on the law and the facts that PDC 
could terminate its relationship with plaintiff, with or without 
cause, after completion of the last "book" assigned to plaintiff. 
Judgment is ordered in favor of defendant. 
Dated this tf day of (y^Z^L^ , 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
SUBMITTED BY: 
WAREMD. FLINT 
Attorney for Defendants 
9 
APPROVED AS TQ^FORM 
CREER 
:orney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT [)&~ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and MARC 
BINGHAM, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 910400806 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Having received memoranda and having considered all the evidence presented at the 
trial of this case, the Court finds that plaintiff performed services for defendants as an 
independent contractor, and not as an employee. Accordingly, plaintiffs action for wrongful 
discharge must fail. 
In their trial briefs, plaintiff and defendants rely on § 35-4-22.3(3) Utah Code Ann. to 
establish the criteria to be considered in order to distinguish between independent contractor 
status and employment status. Although the factors enumerated in § 35-4-22.3(3) are 
contained in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act and are to be considered for the 
purpose of determining eligibility under the act, the Court finds that these factors provide 
helpful guidance in this case. Therefore, the Court has considered the facts of the instant 
case in light of each subsection of § 35-4-22.3(3). 
Subsection (a): Although defendants set broad requirements for location and duration 
of service, and imposed specific reporting requirements, the Court finds that plaintiff was 
essentially free to set his own schedule. 
Subsection (b): Though plaintiff was required to attend an annual meeting, 
Defendants imposed minimal, if any, formal training requirements. They essentially allowed 
him to use his own methods. 
Subsection (c): The Court finds that plaintiffs services were largely independent of 
the success or continuation of defendants' business. 
Subsections (d) and (e): The Court concedes that plaintiffs services probably could 
not have been assigned. However, plaintiff enjoyed the right to hire and supervise others to 
perform his services. 
Subsection (f): Plaintiff enjoyed a continuing relationship with defendants, but did so 
only by continuing to accept new "books" as defendants offered them to him. Plaintiff 
essentially worked on a job-by-job basis. 
Subsection (g): See Courts consideration of subsection (a). 
Subsection (h): The Court finds that plaintiff was free to devote time to other 
endeavors and did so. 
Subsection (i): Plaintiff was not physically within defendants' direction and 
supervision, and he used his own car to make his contacts. 
Subsection (j): Plaintiff enjoyed substantial flexibility in setting and working at his 
own pace. 
Subsection (k): Plaintiff was required to submit regular reports. 
Subsection (1): Plaintiff was paid on a straight commission basis. 
Subsection (m): Although plaintiff could cover some of his expenses through 
"trades," he was ultimately responsible for his expenses and was not entitled to 
reimbursement. 
Subsection (n): Defendants supplied some forms for plaintiffs use in his sales. 
However, plaintiff was responsible for any other materials to the extent that they were 
necessary. 
Subsection (o): The Court finds that subsection (o) is largely inapplicable to the 
instant case because the nature of the business at issue does not require a "real, essential, and 
adequate investment" (other than an automobile perhaps). At any rate, it is clear that 
plaintiff did not depend on defendants for "such facilities." 
Subsection (p): Plaintiffs profits or losses were directly related to the services he 
performed and the good or poor decisions he made. 
Subsection (q): Although plaintiff devoted some time to his heating and air 
conditioning business, the Court concedes that he primarily worked for the defendants. 
Subsection (r): The Court acknowledges that plaintiff did not have his own office, 
hold a business license, maintain a business telephone, advertise, etc. 
Subsection (s): Defendants could not have terminated plaintiff on any particular job, 
unless plaintiff breached his contract. 
Subsection (t): Plaintiff probably could have terminated his relationship with 
defendants at any time. 
Although a few or the factors considered above weigh in favor of a finding of 
employment, on balance the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that plaintiff was an 
independent contractor. Therefore the Court concludes that defendants were entitled to 
terminate their relationship with plaintiff, with or without cause, after completion of the last 
"book" assigned to plaintiff. Judgement is ordered in favor of defendants. 
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 10th day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: John Preston Creer, Esq. 
Edward D. Flint, Esq. 
33; 
